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Industrial agglomerations or “clusters” arise in the presence of industry-specific 
and local externalities, also called Marshallian externalities. The standard 
argument is that such externalities may justify a policy of infant-industry 
protection to allow and encourage clusters to emerge. This paper explores that 
argument and shows that different policy implications emerge under a more 
realistic modeling of clusters. In particular, rather than distorting prices to 
promote clusters in “advanced” sectors that may exhibit strong clustering 
possibilities, countries should focus instead on promoting clustering in current 
sectors that have demonstrated the strongest comparative advantage. Import 
substitution is not a proper way to achieve such a goal. 
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  31. Introduction 
 
There is a long tradition among both academics and development practitioners that associates 
economic development with the realization of agglomeration economies. In policy circles, this is 
evident in the focus on “clusters” as an important concept in understanding growth and in 
thinking about development policy (Porter, 1990). Clusters arise in the presence of “Marshallian 
externalities,” according to which firms benefit from the production and innovation activities of 
neighboring firms in the same and related industries.
2 There is abundant evidence that such 
externalities exist and lead to industry-level agglomeration (Rosenthal and Strange, 2003). But 
what is the appropriate policy in the presence of Marshallian externalities (ME)? From a classical 
optimal-policy perspective, the correct approach would be to provide a production subsidy to 
firms generating ME, with the subsidy calibrated to match the strength of the externality. The 
problem, of course, is that this places very stringent information requirements on policy. The 
general impression is that “advanced” or “technology-intensive” sectors are the ones where ME 
are strongest, and recent empirical evidence appears to be consistent with this impression.
3 Does 
this validate the common suggestion that countries should promote development of 
technologically advanced sectors, perhaps through Import Substitution? 
In this paper I will argue that Import Substitution or any policy that distorts prices so as 
to push resources towards “advanced” industries is not an appropriate way to deal with ME in the 
context of small developing countries. There are two reasons for this. First, because ME are not 
an intrinsic characteristic of an industry: the same industry could generate ME in one place and 
not the other, in one stage of its evolution and not another. A good example of this is found in the 
experience of many countries that followed Import Substitution strategies and succeeded in 
developing new industrial sectors, but failed to generate clustering and benefit from ME in these 
industries. Something similar happens when poor countries succeed in courting high-tech 
multinationals only to find that they fail to generate significant spillovers once installed. The 
second reason why Import Substitution is not necessarily appropriate in the presence of ME is 
                                                 
2 Marshallian externalities may arise both because of knowledge spillovers or pecuniary externalities (see Krugman, 
1991). Rodríguez-Clare (1996) and Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996) present models where the presence of pecuniary 
externalities associated with economies of scale leads to multiple equilibria and underdevelopment traps. 
3 In a recent review of the evidence, Rosenthal and Strange (2003) conclude that an important component of ME are 
knowledge spillovers, which are obviously stronger for knowledge-intensive industries. 
 
 
  4that if an industry generates stronger ME, then it is likely that some advanced country is already 
benefiting from the higher productivity that comes from clustering in this sector. International 
prices would then be lower and nullify the stronger benefits of clustering. 
The consequence of this last point is that the strength of ME does not matter in choosing 
which clusters to promote. Rather, what matters is plain old comparative advantage. If one takes 
ME and clusters seriously, the correct policy is to promote clustering in existing sectors. To 
show these results in the simplest manner, I start in the next section with a review of the standard 
model of a small open economy where one of the sectors exhibits ME. This model has been used 
to motivate the use of Import Substitution (IS) as a development strategy. I derive the standard 
result that IS makes sense only if the economy has a comparative advantage in the sector that has 
ME. If “advanced” sectors are the ones exhibiting ME, then this already suggests that IS is not a 
reasonable policy for poor countries, which are not likely to have a comparative advantage in 
these sectors. More importantly, if—as argued above—ME are not intrinsic to particular sectors, 
but rather arise from the particular way in which production is organized, then the standard 
model is not appropriate. 
In Section 3 I develop an alternative model, where all sectors are amenable to 
experiencing ME (although the intensity of these externalities may vary across sectors) but this 
depends on the mode of production. Thus, instead of assuming that externalities are associated 
with certain industries, I postulate that externalities are related to the technology with which 
goods are produced. This captures the idea that what matters is not “what you produce, but how” 
(Porter, 1998; De Ferranti et. al., 2001). I will discuss several implications of this model, and in 
particular show that the best policy would be to promote clustering in the sector where the 
country has a comparative advantage, and not in the sector that enjoys the strongest possible ME. 
One drawback of both the standard model and this alternative model is that they 
incorporate only static externalities, whereas the empirical literature reveals that dynamic 
externalities (e.g., external learning by doing) are equally if not more important. Moreover, since 
dynamic externalities are strongly associated with knowledge spillovers (Rosenthal and Strange, 
2003), then it is very likely that they are accompanied by international spillovers, something left 
out of most models. The static nature of the models thus makes them difficult to relate to the 
recent literature on endogenous growth. In Section 4 I show a simple way in which the model 
  5presented in Section 3 can be generalized to incorporate dynamic externalities and international 
spillovers, and show how the income gap between North and South is related to clustering. 
 
2. The Standard Model 
 
This section presents a simple two-sector model to explicitly show how comparative advantage 
affects the ranking among equilibria in the presence of Marshallian economies. 
There are two countries, North and South, two goods and one factor of production, labor, 
in fixed supply, L. Good  1 is produced with constant returns to scale and no aggregate 
externalities, with productivity possibly differing across North and South: a unit of labor 
produces   , where  i 1i  S,N  is a country index. Good  2 is produced with constant returns to 





with     and    . The term   captures ME (i.e., static, local, industry-
specific external economies) that are increasing with industry-wide employment, 
 0  L    1 MinL ,L2i

L2i, but that 
are exhausted once the labor force in a sector reaches the level L   . The term  can be seen as the 
maximum benefits of clustering in sector 2 .
4 Just as for good 1 , there may be exogenous 
productivity differences (independent of ME) across North and South in the production of good  
  (captured by differences in the productivity parameter    ).  2 2i
It is assumed that preferences satisfy the Inada conditions, hence any equilibrium must 
have positive production of both goods. Given the simple production structure of the model, this 
is all that is needed to assume about preferences to derive the main results. 
I focus on a situation where the South is “small,” so that international prices can be 
derived from the equilibrium of the North as if it were an isolated economy. Choosing labor in 
North as the numeraire, international prices are simply given by the North’s unit labor 
requirements. Assuming that in equilibrium L2N  L  then p1
  1/1N and p2
  1/2N. Note 
                                                 
4In the traditional model, L  is infinite, so labor productivity is simply  . The alternative assumption that 
these aggregate externalities are bounded is not only more realistic, but also leads to a simpler analysis. 
2iL2i

  6that the benefits of clustering are reflected in a lower international price of good 2. This will 
become important later on. 


Turning to the equilibrium analysis for South, imagine first that there are no Ricardian 
productivity differences,   for all  ji  1 j,i. Let us confirm that there are multiple equilibria, with 
one equilibrium characterized by complete specialization in good 1 and the other by complete 
specialization in good 2. To confirm that specialization in good 1 is an equilibrium, note that 
with   then  1N  1 p1
  1. Letting  w denote the wage in South, this implies that w  if 
South is specialized in good 1. The unit cost of producing good 2 in South given that all labor is 
devoted to production of good 1  (and hence no benefits of clustering are realized) is then simply 
, which is higher than the international price of this good 
 1







alternative equilibrium entails specialization in good 2. In this case, the wage in South would be 
such that the unit cost of producing good 2 would be equal to the price, or w ,
5 
hence w . Since   1 p1
  1, complete specialization in good 2 is also an equilibrium. 
Although there are multiple equilibria, the wage is not higher in the equilibrium with 
specialization in good 2. This is because even though the economy benefits from clustering in 
this equilibrium, this is exactly compensated by the lower price of this good, which in turn arises 
from the higher productivity in North derived from clustering. 
There are two scenarios in which the equilibrium with complete specialization in good 2 
would be superior to the one with specialization in good 1 for South. In the first one South is the 
only producer of good 2 . For this, of course, the South could no longer be assumed “small.” 
Instead, one would need to solve for the two-country equilibrium. As shown in Helpman and 
Krugman (1985, chapter 3), the presence of ME in sector 2 allows the country that produces this 
good to have a higher wage than the country that specializes in good 1. For this to happen in 
equilibrium, however, it is necessary that the country that specializes in good 2 be small relative 
to the world demand for this good, so that this country produces only this good. 
                                                 
5 It is assumed here that the total labor force in South is higher than L , so that, just as in North, full clustering is 
realized. Otherwise, specialization in good 2 would not be an equilibrium. 
  7The second scenario under which the equilibrium with specialization in good 2 is 
superior to the one with specialization in good 1 entails exogenous productivity differences, so 
that the South has a “latent” or “natural” comparative advantage in the good subject to clustering. 
To see this, drop the assumption that   for all  ji  1 j,i and assume instead that  
2S/1S  2N/1N                      (Assumption 1) 
Specialization in good 1 implies w  and for this to be an equilibrium we need 










That is, the South’s comparative advantage in sector 2 must be weaker than the benefits 
of clustering. On the other hand, specialization in good 2 implies that w . This is an 
equilibrium if w . But given this assumption, this inequality is always satisfied when 







To see which equilibrium has a higher wage, note that the equilibrium with specialization 
in good j has w  jS/jN. Given Assumption 1, the wage with specialization in good 2 is 
higher. Just as in basic trade theory, the wage is higher if the economy specializes in the sector 
where it has a comparative advantage. The difference here is that, due to Marshallian economies, 
the economy could find itself specialized in a sector where it doesn’t have a natural comparative 
advantage. In this case, the goal of trade policy would be to push the economy towards the other 
equilibrium, a goal that could be achieved through a temporary tariff on good 2. Of course, this 
is nothing more than the classic case for infant-industry protection, where policy is supposed to 
turn a natural comparative advantage into an effective one. 
This analysis emphasizes that for infant-industry protection to make sense, it is not only 
necessary that the protected sector exhibit Marshallian externalities but also that the country have 
a natural comparative advantage in that sector. This may present a problem for the practical 
relevance of this idea, since the good with Marshallian externalities is usually regarded as an 
“advanced” good, making it unrealistic to expect LDCs to have a comparative advantage in this 
sector relative to developed countries. More importantly, a problem with this model is that it 
  8assumes that the expansion of sector 2 necessarily brings about the benefits of clustering. As 
mentioned in the Introduction, however, this is not a reasonable assumption. In the next section I 
explore this issue in detail. 
 
3. An Alternative Model 
 
This section presents a model that deviates from the standard model in that both sectors exhibit 
Marshallian economies (perhaps to different degrees), although the realization of these 
economies is not a necessary outcome of the expansion of the sector. The critical assumption is 
that there are different technologies that can be used to produce a good, and that these 
technologies differ in the extent to which they generate externalities: clustering only happens if 
firms use the “modern” technology. This captures the idea that even sectors that are seen as 
“advanced” in developed countries, can behave as backward or traditional sectors when they 
operate in LDCs, and hence fail to generate any externalities. Thus, this model shifts attention 
from “goods” or “sectors" to modes of production as the crucial determinants of clustering. 
There are two goods, both of which could exhibit Marshallian economies. Each good can 
be produced using two technologies, which I call “backward” and “modern,” respectively. The 
backward technology entails labor productivity  , where  ji j  1,2 is a sector index and i  S,N 




The only difference with the case above is that here ME depend on the amount of labor 
employed using the modern technology,  LjiM. I allow L j to vary across sectors, and hence 
 will vary with  j  L  j
 j (although it is assumed that L  1 j
   for j  1,2). Also, note that the 
exogenous productivity parameter   is independent of the technology used.  ji
Goods are ordered in such a way that  , so that North has a natural 
comparative advantage in good 2. To simplify the exposition, I rule out the possibility that the 
static benefits of clustering are decreasing in 
2N/2S  1N/1S
j to such an extent that   is lower for  jN/jSj
j  2 than for j  1. That is, I rule out the possibility that the sector in which the North has a 
Ricardian comparative advantage has much lower clustering potential. The role of this 
assumption will become clear below. 
  9As in the previous section, I focus on the case where South is “small,” so that 
international prices are completely determined by the equilibrium in North. To derive this 
equilibrium, note that the economy could be producing each good with clustering, with all labor 
employed in the sector using the modern technology (LjNM  LjN) and productivity  ( ) 
higher than the one associated with the backward technology ( 
jNj
jN ), or without clustering, with 
all labor employed in the sector using the backward technology (LjNB  LjN) and productivity 
higher than with the modern technology, which in this case would be zero (since LjNM  0 ). In 
other words, there are multiple equilibria.
6 To simplify the analysis, it is assumed in the rest of 
this section and the next one that there are clusters in all sectors in North. Thus, equilibrium 
prices are simply pj
  1/jjN. 
Turning to the South, imagine first that there are no Ricardian productivity differences, 
 for all  ji  1 j,i, and also that   for  j   j  1,2. There are multiple equilibria: an equilibrium 
where the South specializes in a sector with a cluster (it could be either good 1 or good 2), in 
which case there is no income gap between North and South (i.e., 1/  ¡1), and an equilibrium 
where the South has no clusters and there is no trade, in which case the income gap is given by 




With Ricardian productivity differences and differences in the intensity of static 
externalities across sectors (i.e.,  ), there is an equilibrium in which South specializes 
completely in sector 1 and there is no cluster in this sector. The income gap would be 
. There is also an equilibrium with complete specialization in sector 1 with a cluster, 
in which case the income gap would be  . Finally, it could also be that South specializes 
completely in sector 2. This would only happen if good 2 were produced with the modern 
technology and clustering. This is an equilibrium if and only if nobody wants to deviate and 
produce good 1 with the backward technology. To derive conditions for this, note that if South 





                                                 
6 To be more precise, there are four equilibria: one with no clustering, one with clustering in both sectors, one with 







Thus,  . The unit cost of good 1 produced in South without a cluster would 
be   . For complete specialization in good 2 with a cluster to be an 














 1  
                      (Condition 1)  
 
Summarizing, there are multiple equilibria in the (small) South. One equilibrium entails 
complete specialization in the sector with the highest relative productivity (i.e., sector 1) and 
clustering in this sector. Another equilibrium entails complete specialization in this same good, 
but without a cluster. Finally, there is another equilibrium with complete specialization in sector 
 as long as Condition 1 is satisfied. The first equilibrium, which entails clustering in the sector 
with strongest comparative advantage, generates the highest income level. The second 
equilibrium, with specialization in that sector but without clustering, generates the lowest income 
level. The third equilibrium has an intermediate level of income. However, note that   does not 
affect income in this equilibrium. This is because the higher productivity generated by the 




There is one important implication of these results regarding the income ranking of the 
different equilibria. If the government could choose the equilibrium, it would always choose an 
equilibrium with clustering, which is not surprising, but it would also choose an equilibrium with 
specialization in the sector with the strongest comparative advantage; the strength of externalities 
is not relevant for the choice among equilibria. This has important and surprising policy 
implications, since it implies that the government should not necessarily choose to promote 
clustering in sectors with strongest externalities. 
 
  114. Discussion 
 
There are several additional policy implications of this model that I wish to highlight and 
discuss. The first is that protection in no way makes it more likely that a cluster will form, since 
the good can be produced without a cluster. Consider an initial situation where South is 
completely specialized in sector 1 with no cluster. Imposing a policy of Import Substitution (IS) 
would increase the domestic prices of good   and at some point South would start producing 
some of this good. But it could produce it without a cluster, just as it produces good 1 without a 
cluster. There is no reason why IS would lead to clustering! In other words, once we accept that 
production in the advanced sector can take place using backward technologies or modes of 
production, then it becomes clear that IS does not necessarily lead to externalities and clustering. 
IS could simply push resources towards what are regarded in rich countries as advanced sectors, 
but that once in LDCs could be organized in ways that do not generate any externalities. 
2
This reasoning has broader implications. Not only IS, but any policy (even export 
promotion) that distorts prices so as to push resources into advanced sectors would have the 
same problem. Instead of policies to reallocate resources across sectors, it would be better to 
implement policies to promote clustering in sectors that already show comparative advantage. 
This implies that, as generally accepted by proponents of cluster-based policies, governments 
should not try to create clusters from scratch. 
An additional implication is that promoting a cluster is not necessarily welfare enhancing, 
since it could be a cluster without a comparative advantage. To see this, imagine that the South 
has no clusters. This immediately implies that it is specialized in sector 1. Imagine further that 
the government tries to promote a cluster in sector 2 and that 1S/1N  2S/2 1 N . To do so, it 
would have to distort prices, because—since Condition 1 is not satisfied by Assumption 1—
clustering in sector 2  is not an equilibrium with undistorted prices. But if it does this, then 
welfare would decrease. Alternatively, if Condition 1 is satisfied, then there is an equilibrium 
with full specialization in sector 2 with a cluster, and it is conceivable that the government could 
induce the economy to switch to this superior equilibrium. Still, this equilibrium is inferior to the 
one with complete specialization and clustering in sector one. To summarize, when there are 
Ricardian differences (more generally, comparative advantage coming from sources different 
than clustering), promoting the creation of a cluster from scratch may be inferior to the status 
  12quo, and is always dominated by promotion of a cluster in sectors where the economy is already 
showing comparative advantage. 
Finally, the model shows that it is not the case that governments should favor clustering 
in industries with stronger externalities. As explained in the previous section, this is because such 
stronger externalities lead to higher productivity and hence lower international prices. Thus, for 
example, if we imagine that higher indexed goods are “more advanced” and that more advanced 
goods have stronger externalities, then    . A common presumption here would be that 
policy should target more advanced sectors, to benefit from stronger clustering. The model 
presented here shows that this presumption is not correct. Instead, the appropriate policy is to 
promote clustering in the sector that has the strongest comparative advantage. Thus, industrial 
policy is not about “creating comparative advantage,” but about achieving the high productivity 
that comes from a cluster in the sector where it has a comparative advantage. 
2  1
 
5. Dynamic Externalities and International Spillovers 
 
In contrast to the models explored above, which focus exclusively on static externalities, the 
empirical literature reveals that dynamic externalities play a very important role in industrial 
agglomeration. Moreover, given that knowledge spillovers are the main mechanism through 
which these dynamic externalities operate, it is likely that they are accompanied by international 
spillovers. Although the region where the knowledge originates is likely to benefit more and 
sooner, other regions are likely to benefit as well from spillovers. This section presents a very 
simple way to introduce dynamic externalities and international knowledge spillovers into the 
model developed above. The policy implications discussed are not affected; the purpose of this 
section is to add realism to the cluster-based model and allow for a sharper comparison between 
this model and the recent endogenous growth literature. 
The model is similar to the one presented in the previous section, although now it is 
assumed that production with the modern technology generates both dynamic as well as static 
externalities. To introduce dynamic externalities and international spillovers, I allow for an 
additional productivity variable, Ajit, that increases with time thanks to external industry-specific 
learning by doing and international spillovers. Labor productivity across sectors and technologies 
  13is just as above, except that now it is also multiplied by this variable Ajit. Just as with  ,  ji Ajit is 
independent of the technology used. 
jSt
1   a
 a
max
It is simpler to first explain the assumptions regarding dynamic externalities for a single 
economy (i.e., no international spillovers). In each sector, production with the backward 
technology generates no learning, whereas production with the modern technology generates 
external but sector-specific learning by doing, which leads to increasing productivity in 
manufacturing according to:  
.
Ajit  g/L  jMinL  j,LjiMAjit  
if LjiM  L  j then 
.
Ajit /Ajit  g in steady state. 
Productivity increases caused by dynamic externalities in one country eventually diffuse 
to the other country even if there is no cluster there. Thus, in this model clusters are important to 
generate knowledge but are not critical to benefit from knowledge spillovers. Imagine for 
concreteness that North has a cluster in sector j but the South does not. Then it is assumed that 
the rate of growth of the productivity variable AjSt is governed by: 
.
AjSt  1  ajStAjSt  
where   g and a . This formulation captures the idea that there are “benefits of 
backwardness,” in the sense that a lower relative productivity in South (i.e., lower a ) leads, 
ceteris paribus, to a faster rate of productivity growth. This implies that for a given parameter 
jSt  AjSt/AjNt
, 
there is a steady state gap AjSt/AjNt   a given implicitly by g   . If ajSt  , then the 
benefits of backwardness will lead to an increase in a  until it reaches  jSt  a. In contrast, if 
ajSt   a, then the benefits of backwardness are too weak, and the international spillovers will be 
weaker than learning by doing in North, leading to divergence and hence falling a , a process 
that will continue until a  reaches the steady state gap 
jSt
jSt  a. 
More generally, letting a  and a , growth in  jSt  maxAjSt/AjNt,1 jNt  AjNt/AjSt,1
Ajit is determined by both learning by doing (if there is a cluster) and international spillovers: 
 
.
Ajit  g/L  jMinL  j,LjiMAjit  1  ajitAjit  
  14The first term on the RHS captures learning by doing, whereas the second term captures 
international spillovers. 
Given these assumptions governing dynamic externalities and international spillovers, if 
the South does not have a cluster in sector j , its labor productivity there at time t in steady state 
would be  . In contrast, the North’s productivity in sector  jSAjSt  jS
 aAjNt j, where we are 
assuming it has a cluster, would be  . Thus, the ratio of productivities in North versus 
South in sector 
jNj t AjN
j under these circumstances would be  . The first term captures 
pure Ricardian productivity differences, whereas the second and third terms capture the impact 
of the static and dynamic benefits of clustering, respectively. 
jN/jSj1/ a
Just as in the previous section, prices are derived from the equilibrium in North as if it 
were an isolated economy. I then analyze the equilibrium in South considered as a small 
economy. The focus is on steady state equilibria. Assuming for simplicity that the North has 
clusters in all sectors (and that LjNM  L  j for j  1,2 ) the steady state equilibrium in North has 
productivity given by   in sector  jNAjNtj j at time t. Thus, steady state international prices are 
pjt
  1/jNAjNtj with 
.
AjNt /AjNt  g. 
Imagine first that there are no Ricardian productivity differences,   for all  ji  1 j,i, and 
also that   for  j    1 j  1,2 . There is an equilibrium where the South specializes in a sector 
with a cluster (in which case there would be no income gap) and an equilibrium where the South 
has no clusters, there is no trade, and AjSt   aAjNt for all j,t. Thus, in the backward equilibrium 
the income gap is given by  . The term  captures the benefits of static externalities, 
while 
/ a  1
1/ a  captures the benefits of dynamic externalities (although capped by the international 
spillovers). If the South moves to an equilibrium with a cluster in sector j, then productivity 
would jump instantaneously thanks to the static externalities, and there would also be a dynamic 
effect, reflected in a temporary increase in the growth rate of AjSt above g, to: 
.
AjSt  gAjSt  1  ajStAjSt  
where I have assumed that LjSM  L  j. Clearly, in this case, AjSt would eventually converge to 
AjNt and the income gap would disappear. 
  15With Ricardian productivity differences and differences in the intensity of static 
externalities across sectors (i.e.,    ), the set of equilibria is analogous to the set of 
equilibria derived in the model of the previous section: there is an equilibrium where South is 
specialized in good 1 with a cluster and income gap  ; another equilibrium where the 
South is specialized in good 1 with no cluster, in which case the income gap is  ; 
and finally, there is another equilibrium where South is specialized in good 2 as long as a 
condition similar to Condition 1 is satisfied, except that now we must also take into account the 








Let us focus on the equilibrium where the South is specialized in good 1 with no cluster. 
As in many recent models of growth (Parente and Prescott, 1994; Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare, 
2004), both North and South grow at the same rate, so there is no convergence. In contrast to 
many of these models, however, it is not necessary for South to increase its investment in 
technology adoption to catch up with the North. Convergence would occur if South managed to 
develop a cluster, so that it too could generate both static and dynamic externalities. 
To summarize, the insights gained with the static model remain valid when we move to a 
more realistic setting with dynamic externalities and international spillovers. Countries with no 
clusters suffer from the lack of both static and dynamic externalities, although the income gap is 
bounded thanks to international spillovers. There are multiple equilibria, and the equilibrium 
with the highest income in South is the one where there is clustering in the sector where its 
comparative advantage is strongest. Policy should focus on promoting clustering in this sector 
and avoid price distortions. 
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